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La.tin Pnenc a !:". the 193~s
Carlos F. Diaz AleJarr...ro*

Yale Uni versit:•

Latin .Anerican developr.1ent experi enced a turnin g po.int dur:1.n;-:;
the

1930s.

'!he co!ltra st behreen ..befor e and after 1929" may ofte:1 be exag
gerate d, but there is little doubt that the decade ~~tnessed a closi.r
ie
tov;ard inte!'! 'lation al trade and financ e, and a relati ve upsurge of irnpor
t
substi tuti.n2; activ ities, prima rily but not exclus ively in ma."1ufacturl.•1
f~.
Other trends visibl e before 1929, such as urban izatio n a"ld a P;r'Q\tr..:.11f;
intere st by the state in prcnot:ing econo!'!lic develo prent, contin ued into
the 193Os, a~d accele rated in some count ries. Memories o~ the 193Os
r.ave profoundly influe nced the re~,,ion's attitu de toward intern ationa l
trade and financ e; per capita foreig;n trade :1nd!cators reacr~ d by tr:e
late 192Os were not StL""!)assed in maJ\Y nation s until t."1e 196Os.
least some latm American econom:!.es perfor ned surpri singly v!ell
during the 193Os, relati ve t-0 North A.r:ierica, a."'ld relati ve to what avercif"
e
i'l,t

opinio n would have expec ted to happen in quite open, prinar tJ-pro d:ict
expor ting nation s. 'lhis essa_v will view the econcn ic perfonna."lce of
each cour,try as the result of the magnitude of the exogenous extern al
shock receiv ed, of the policy 11r=asures undertaken by danes tic autho rities
to speed adjus' brent to those shoc1'..s and to seek extern al and intern
al
balanc e, and of the resili ence of local privat e agents 1n respon ding

the new coost ellatio n of profi t oppor tuniti es.

to

Shock s, polici es and

capac ities to transf ann differ ed substa ntiall y 1'rarl country to countr
y.
Abilit y and will.ing;less to manip ulate policy 1nstni nents such
as nanina .l exchange rates, tariff s and danes tic credit lft!re greate st

-2in countrie s "'t-.1c:i were e!ther relative ly :.a..~e, sue~, as Braz!.l, or had

relative ly autoncn: ius putl1c sectors , sue~ as Ccsta R!ca and ~-i.1a,·: .
&nailer cou.ritr:!es, e.g., Hc:ndu:ras, or those with hig.rtl.y der,ende.""lt

•

governr.ients, e.g., CUt,a. had less roar. for pol1c:: I!la"'leuver.

I..al1=e

d~stic mar~ets encoura.r:;ed resource reallocat 10!'1 !r. the circ:.r.1Sta."1ces of

the 1930s. and had already induced substan tial !ndustr ial capa~it~_, before
the:1.

Other strJctu ral featu.~ s, such as the product ion charact eristics

of traditio nal ex;,orts , and the extent of foreign cootrol of local

banking and land, also played a role 1n deterr.rl ning the elastic ity of
response to the new relative prices.

'lhe general lzatioo that l~enes s

and polic:; autonoot; were favorab le to perfonna nce covers ool,v republic s
with namirJal soverei ~t:,.

Paradox ically, sane clear-cu t colonies in

the Garibbea."1 appear to have perform ed better than Cuba or the n:r.i.in.ican
Republi c.
Mera of exoort- led growth culmina ted in Latin America during
the 1920s.

In sane countrie s., such as Chile, Cuba and Brazil, the

11mitat ioos of externa l demand for the traditio nal staple had becane
clear by the late 1920s, while in others those years witnesse d unpre
cedented export booms.

Foreign capital , both portfol io and direct,

flowed massive ly into both types of countrie s up until 1929, so balance
of payments surplus or at least equilib? 1 tm1 were the rule.
rest

or the

As in the

world, there had been a return to the gold exchange standard

in La.tin America, and price stabilit y ~-as also the rule, for the last

t ~ in this century .

It is moot whether the ternm of trade and the

capital 1nr1ow of the late 1920s could have been expecte d to persist .
In fact such externa l and interna l balances were n.adely and repeated ly
a:tx>cked 1'ran the outside , starting in 1929 and ~ t the 1930s.
'lbe externa l shocks at a,ce were reflecte d in balance of pa_vnents deficits ,

-3wt.ic:-.

t,:.,

t:,e::-.selves trigr:ere d nechanis."!IS of aa.!ustJne:.t, scr.ie ver:,

cllmlSy a"ld painful .
'lhe rest of the paper will chronic le ho\<: va."'1.ous Latin Am=rica-.
countrie s coped v.ith the cr.isis and the extent to which they were able
to n:ot:!..lize mec1°'.ar-.!srm: of ad,_1ustnent beycnd deflatio n.

':he nature

a:::d ~tude s o:' the externa l shocks will first be narrated .

Secondlv

the Va...'"ious policy reaction s to those shocks w!ll be discusse d, covering
!neasu.~s seekin8: to regain externa l and .interna l balance , as well as
policie s 'ta.rr,eted towa:rd loneer term goals.
and welfare performa nces will be explore d,

Then the p-lobal, sectora l
a'1d

the sense 1.11 wr;ich econornies

d:!d or did not do reasonab ly well will be analyzed .

An

overall inter

pretatio n of events dur:!np: the 1930s \\'ill close the paper.

II. EXTEFNAL SHOCKS Af-11) TRDIDS

'Ihe breakdown during 1929--1933 of the .interna tional econcrnic
order ~-as transmi tted to Lat.in America first of all by sharp changes
in relative prices:
dollar 111;:>ort prices.

dollar export prices collapse d rrnre steeply than
With.in four years the te~-- of trade fell by

21 to 45 percent in countrie s for which canpara ble data are availab le
(Nacione s Unidas, 1976).

Lat.in American tenns of trade had, of course,

experien ced steep declines before, as during 1920-21 , but the magnitude of the coll&pse cornb:1ned,for many countri es, with the ccnt.inu ation
of unfavor able ter:ns of trade throug."1out the rest of the decade, 1n spite
of sare post-19 3; recove!"'J, was unprece dented at least during the era
~

of export- led growth.

As a good first approxim ation that tenns of trade

deterio ratioo ma.v be regarded as primari ly exogeno us to Lat1n America;
even those countrie s which could 1nnuen ce 1ntema tiaial prices

re~..ilated t ~ t:!.Cl'la..1 ex;x>rts so as not to worsen their dclla:- p:-ices
nc late:- tha.-i du.......,...r~-; t:,e enrl:: 1930s.
For- a countz:1 ~-! th a ratio of expo~ s to Gross Natioo al Produ
ct
(G:\1?) o~ one third a deteri orat1c m of the te:!T'lS of trade by
th!rty

•

perce:-it would re;ireser-.t a loss 1n real incor.e o~ about one tenth,
assw.~ ~
r.o cha:-~e in p:-~1s:!.cal outpu t. '!'he blow to G~2 appea rs to have been
sc,ften ed

~

so!"l2 cou.'1tr!.es t:: a rore t:1ar. propo rticna l fall 1n the

profit s of expor tinh fore!.m enterp rises; data oo the fall of real
return ed value are unava ilable _for ioost count ries.

Cxl the other hand,

there are h!."lts that out of the lower forei ~ profit s a larger s!".are

ma:.' have sou:",ht to be re;:u tted abroad, espec1 all~' durinp ; the early years
of the crisis . which may have broUf',ht furthe r pressu re on the bala"lc
e
of p~nen ts.
Excep t for the s;:-ect acular Chilea n and CUban cases, the ccntra ctioo
:1n the expor t quantum durinl::: 1929-1933 was substa ntiall y less
than the

tenns of trade deteri oratio o, and by the late 1930s the expor t quantu
m of
severa l count ries had surpas sed the 1928·1929 level. Latin Americ
an
expor ts were predar.u.nantly rural and m:Lru..n.g produ cts, the fonner showi..
- ie
a smalle r price elasti city of supply than the latter .

Sane rural produ cts,

such as coffee a"ld livest ock, follow ed su1 gener is outpu t cycles rooted
in their produ ctive chara cteris Ucs, contri buting to short-- run price
1nelas t1c1ty of supply .
'!he ccmnod1ty lotter y brcur:-..~ t relief to sane count ries even
:1n
the midst of gloacy extern al cond1t 1ons.

Gold prices were raised by

Url.ted States rocnetary policy ; United States suppo rt programs for
silve r
and agricu ltural camo oities also improved a few Latin American expor
t
prices (altho ugh saneti mes at the expense of marke t shares, as with
CUban sugar ). Droughts 1n North America favore d expor ters or tenper

ate
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~i.is trend had been visible already

durinc: the 1920s, particu larly 1n the rore developed cour.tr ies of the
re,:-J.:)r.. F.xc:1c.r.re contro ls a:id multip le excha'lroe rates d1scoura,r--,::rr
pr:)~i t re::u. tta.'"lces rna:· have induced 1n the sho!'t ru.'1 sane reirwe s~:-it

of p:-of:. ts in ner: local act! Vi ties, espec! ally a~ter the early 1930s.

late 1930s also witness ed the inflow of r e ~ capita l frcI'1
Europe, and there were even propos als to make Buenos Aires an
~

interna tional money center , replac ing those threate ned b;-' Eu..---opea11
tension s.
'Ihe erne~ence of a protec tionist and nation alistic Center was

the greate st shock to lat.in American econcmies during the 1930s. As
late as 1931 it was still unclea r whether the decline in econa:dc activit y
1n indust rialize d countr ies was anothe r passing recessi on or saneth
ing
more seriou s.

&it by that date it seemed very likely that one was

witnes sing the end of laissez faire and of the camdtnen_t of leading
countr ies to relativ ely free trade. Already duri..n.g the 1920s 1.'l';}erial
p~fere nces were advocated 1n Britain by influe ntial groups , and the
1928 presid ential electio n 1n the United States was accanpar..ied by a

orotec ticru.s t wave. That ferment was followed by passage of the Snoot
Hal-;ley tariff in 1930 and the British fl.bno!'mal In;>ortations Act of 1931.
Even 1f prospe rity returne d to the Center , the outlook for Latin American
export s ca:;:,et1t1ve with product1Cl'l 1n indw;t rial countr ies or 1n
their colau.e s or camon wealth s, rang ing~ sugar and copper to meat

and wool, looked grim.

As the depres sioo deepened, protec tialisrn

-7ga!.'1ec gro..r1c:

Br! t:..s:--~ Coor.on.\1.-ealt!: pre~ere:1ces were adopted 1n Otta..:a

i.'1 1932, while F'ra.'1ce, Gernany and Japa:: also re:1nforced their pro

tectionisr;-; and discrirr.1natory trade aJTa.'1t_:e.r:'lents for areas under their
political hegerrony.
It is ti-ue that in 1934 Cordell Hull, United States Secretary
of State, sta.""ted a policy of reduc~ United States tariffs, but suc:h
policy ma.de slm-.- progress, and had to v:hi ttle dow:1 a tariff wall raised
not only by the &x:>ot-P.a.wley Act but also by the deflation induced
increase in the incidence of specific duties.

The brip,,htest and best

inforrred observers of the international econany as it stood by 193ll
probably had difficulty in forecasting the shape of the new inter
national econa:uc order for the next ten years, but it is unlikely
that the:, would have urged Latin America.11 countries to wait for export
led expa.11sioo.

As it turned out, by that date circumstances had pushed

many Latin American policy makers into considerable experimentatioo,
without the need of sage foreign advice, which had sharply depreciated
during the crisis.

III. POLICIES
Under gold~xchange standard rules, a deficit :1n the balance
of payments set off automatic rechanism.s of adjustrrent w1 thout the reed
for discretionary actions by policy makers.

As the slowdown :1n the

Center econam.es already visible :1n 1929 plus rampant protecticnism
were quickly translated :into a decline of export values :1n ttie Periphery,
a balance of payments already weakened by a decline 1n capital inflows
turned negative, and gold and foreign exchange fiowed out of I.atin

America.

Naninal rrmey supplies declined during the early stages of

"
-othe crisi s, w~-.!.le 1!",t.erest rates were ke;:-t no lowe
r

•

t:-..an those in the

majo r 1ntem atio:- :al ri..,~ cial cente rs, all 1n accor d
1Gth tt,e then
ortho dox rules cf the ga."!le. Falli ng price leve ls helpe
d r.iai.."1tain real
liq_u idity , also as textb ooks pred! cted, altl)o w,h setti
r'~ o!'f less
textbookis~J expe ctati ons a'1d fea.""S of ba"U'.J"UJ)tcies.
As early as 1930 sane Latin American policyrral-:ers beGa""
l to
recon sider the wisdcr.i of rernai.."1!.."lt fa.1 tr.fu l to the o!'tho
dox r..ues of
the garre. 'lhe recon sider ation was not due to new theo
retic al insig hts,
but to tht press ure of circum.sta"lces. f."..a.intaining f;Old
parit ies
when

forei gi exchani;e reser ves were disap pear! nr; and forei
gn capi tal mark ets
were prac tical ly shut to new Latin American bond issue
s beca:,e foolh ardy.
Eala~cinr: the budg et when custcms reven ues were coll
aps~ and civil
serva "lts were revo lting became nearl y jr,Jpo ssible . Timid
ly at first

and loudl y pran ising a quick retur n to late 1920s pari
ties and prac tices ,
polic y makers in coun tries where instru ment s were at
hand or where
suffi cier. t autonOllzy allow ed their creat icri be~ to
repla ce ~ld excha"lge
sta'1d ard rules with "er.iergency'' discr eticr iary tinke ring•
. Perip heral
sha.-re and self- doub ts g1-ad ually gave

\li"B._V

to self- conf idenc e, espe ciall y

afte r Brita in abandoned the gold standard 1n 1931 and
Gerna"ly and the
Unite d State s embarked ai the1r •own expe rimen ts.
'lhe follo wmg descr ipt1o o of meas ures 1.11dertake
n throu ghou t the

1930 s risks attri butin g to ''Autonaoous Polle y" a serie
s of 1n:pr ovisa t1ons
mre or less forced by circu msta nces, and whose logic
ma..v be clear er

!!. ~ than
am:ng

at the time of their adop tioo.

Ole wvuld searc h 1n vain

publi c state ment s by ecooanic auth oriti es of t:tx>se days for

reaso oed expl anati ais for the switc h fran the old rules
to the new

discr etioo ; cruy by the late 1930s !! ~ rat1C l'l8.l izatia
is or sane

-9intellec~ual we!g!;t bega:-, to appear.
by

Yet the thr-11St of pol!cies adopted.

the oore autonOC10us and reactive renubllcs may be viewed as atte""::pts

to avoid the costs o!' the deflation called for by the classical JTEcha'1ism
of adjustment, and to speed u~ a."Tival to the new constellation of

relative prices and resource allocation consistent with the post-1929
realities o!' the ir:ternat.icnal econor.iy.

A. EYc!1a!1f:e Rate Policies
Reactive countries by 1933 had naninal excha.~ge rates relative to
the dollar significantly above the late 1920s parities.

'lhe use of

multiple excharige rates buttressed by exchan~e controls beca-ne ~~despread
follO\d.nr, the September 1931 devaluation of the pound sterlin1:1;.
applicable to :imports suffered the sharpest depreciations.

Rates

Fears that

devaluation would further worsen foreim prices for traditional exports
motivated lower depreciations for rates applicable to them but non
traditional exports received more favorable rates.

Fiscal self-interest

led to advantageous rates for servicing the public debt; the spread
between major buyir.g and sellir.p: rates also became a convenient source

of public revenue.

Memories of late nineteenth centuries inflations

under the "inconvertible paper standard, 11 such as those of Argentina and
Brazil, ma.de policy makers anxious about exchange rate depreciations,
and sane darrestic and foreign advisors urged either an eventual or an
inrnediate return to the parities of the late 1920s.

Lip service was

paid to an eventual restoration of the gold standard, but policy neker3
1n reactive countries went no further than checking "excessive" depre

c1at1cris.
&nail or vecy dependent countries., such as Hcriduras, Guaterrala,
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F.a.1 ti , D:rx.i:1ca11 P.ep:.:l :1 c, Pa."'la;:ia and CUba minta!n
ed thei r pe~ to the
Uu.t ed Stat es doll2 .!' tr-:ow,.~ut the 1930s.
'!he la.st two cou ntne s did
not even have a C,e."ltral Bank or a corresponding
monetary author1t y,
such as those of Bra zil, or pre-1935 Argentina.
Excha~e coop-01 ·
rneas;.ires in the snal l or pass ive coun tries were
on the whole less
forc e~~ tha~ L~ rea~ t!ve cou.~tries.
Data on pric~ leve ls a"'ld rooney wages are scarce
fer the 1930s,
espe cial ly for the sma ller coun tries . Nev erth eles
s, avai labl e 1nfonna.tion
:rndicates that no.'Tl1nal deva luat ioos 1n the reac
tive coun tries r-.ad weak
i"'lflatior.ar:; consequences, coot rary to the expe
rience 1n late r year s.
By 19:;_c..34, ther efor e, !!_a l irrpo rt exch
ange rate s with resp ect

to the

doll ar, which take into account pric e leve l cha.~
ges dan esti call y and
abroad, had rise n (dep reci ated ) between 30 and
90 perc ent in Argentina,
Bra zil, Chil e, Cola:Jb1a, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay,
rela tive to 1925

-29

leve ls.

Such real pric es of doll ars in terms of loca l curr
ency rena ined
at thos e depr ecia ted leve ls also durinr, 1935-39.
As m:mey wages :1n thos e
coun tries appear to have followed pric e leve l roov
e~nts when the decade
is regarded as a whole, the rati o of exchange rate
s to nani nal wages
also rose s1.grJ.ficantl._v.
For the sma ller or pass ive coun tries me ma..v cCl'l
jecture that ther e
was no such rapi d and larg e real depr ecia tioo
s of exchange rate s. In the
caribbean and Cen tral Arrerica the shar pest Depressi
on-:rnduced deva luat ion
occurred 1n Costa Rica, with a sma ller one occu
rring 1n El Salvador;
othe r sma ll coun tries main taine d thei r pegs to
the doll ar or underwent
mcnetary changes due to doo estic tuno oil. ~
coun tries havj ng a stea dy
peg to the doll ar atte n;,te d to rais e the rati o
or the exchange rate to
nani nal wages by extr aord inar ily repr essi ve labo
r poli cies ; such was the
case of Guatemala l.l'lder General Ubico.

-11-

Regardless of the exchange rate policy followe d, a country
subjecte d to an exogenous and permanent worsening of its interna tional
tenns of trade should witness over the long run a decline in.the price
of its non-trad ed goods and services (or roney wages) relative to the
danestic price of 1rnportable goods, e~couraging a roovement of resourc es,
includin g fresh investm ents, toward the inport CCJii>eting sector,
addition al to that generate d by the decline 1n exportab le-goods prices.
A permanent decline in net lone;-tenn capital inflows would also induce
a decl:1ne in the prices of non-trad ed goods relative to all traded
goods.

Under a gold•-exchange standard

w1 th fixed

rates and with

collapsi ne: interna tional ncminal ·prices for both inports and exports ,
non•-traded goods prices and dcmestic liquidit y had a long

way

to fall

· to adjust to the 1929-1933 decline 1n tenns of trade and the
•
cessatio n of capital 1nnows . It is the working h._vpothesis of this
essa,v that countrie s willing and able to devalue their exchange rate
moved toward the new constel lation of donEstic relative prices rore
speedily and less painful ly than those with fixed rates, l:1rn1tirw,
both price and monetary denatio n, containi ng their ne~tive impact
on real output, or reducing pressure s to depress rooney wages by
extraord inary measures.

It is worth emphasizinP; that the depreci ating

trend :1n the reactive countrie s appears sm:x:>th only 1n

~ ~

f1 ve year averages focusing on exc~e rates w1 th respect to

the dollar.

Besides confus ~ siFna,ls emanating from pranise s t_o return

to earlier paritie s, the early 1930s also witness ed changes 1n the rates
between major currenc ies, particu larly the dollar-p ound sterling rate,
which added to fluctuat ions 1n effectiv e exchange rates of several
countrie s, especia lly 1n South .Anerica,

and

canplic ated the fonna.tion

of expecta tioos about the future price of "foreign exchange."
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.1nport-repress1ng and !!!J?ort-divertinP; polic ies
'!he danes tic price of inpor table goods relat ive to non-t
raded
goods price s, or to money wages, also received an upward push in
many La.tin American count ries as tarif fs rose and quan titati ve re
stric tions , via 1.n;>ort or exchange contr ols, were introd uced. Contrary to what would happen in the late 1940s and 1950s, excha
nge rate
and d~ facto prote ctioo ist polic ies reinfo rced each other as jJypo
rt
repre ssing mechanisms, espec ially in Brazi l and the Southern Cone.
Indeed, by the mid-1930s in same of the react ive count ries there
ma.y have
been redundancy in this fonnidable batte ry of measures; this has
been
argued for the Chilean case, ror example.
'Ille small or passi ve count ries appear to have been gener
ally as

inpot ent •regarding prote ction as with nominal exchange rate manag
ement.
Cub? actua lly lowered tarif fs in 193-4, undoing much of the prote
ction ist
effec t of her anomalous Tarif f Act of 1927. Even large r coun tries
were
press ured into rever sing sate of their early 1930s tarif f incre
ases;
wielcllng the threa t of Catm::mwealth prefe rence s and meat 1.rrpo rt
quota s,
the United Kinp,dorn obtained tarif f concessions rran Argentina under
the
contr overs ial Roca-Runc1man treat y of 1933. Argentina and Cuba
shared
awkward memberships .1n ".infornial en;>ires", altho ugh.t he autonany
of the
fonner country was of course much large r than the latte r.
Tarif f rates appear to have undergone few ·changes 1n level s or
struc ture .1n Mexico and Peru. 'lhese count ries also behaved close
r to
the small er count ries regar ding inpor t and exchange contr
ols; in contr ast

with Brazi l and the Southern Cone they efl;)loyed those instru nents
only
spari ngly. Colanbia, as usual , had an inten nedia te set of polic
ies:
roost of the change between 1927 and 1936 1n the price s of her impor
ted

-13nontradi tiaial manufactures has been attribute d to devaluati on rather
than tariff increases , although increnent s in effective protectio n
st1mulate d soma industrie s, including cement, soap, and rayon textiles.
Colanbia also manipulated inport and exchange caitrols with greater
vigor.tha n Mexico and Peru.
In:port and exchange caitrols, together with multiple rates,
had the additiaia l task of managing key bilateral balances, especiall y
in Brazil and the Southern Cone; in countries with less diversifi ed
tr-c.-::ing and financial patterns such management was less of a problem.
Argentine controls were practical ly forced upon her by the United
Kingdan pressure for bilateral clearings ; to achieve that goal Argentina
had to discrimin ate against United States exports.

Such '!buying from

those that bought fran her" ~nerated hostility in the United States
'
against Argentina, and some North Americans viewed her·contr ols as a
sigri of Nazi rather than British influence .

Brazilian controls, in

fact, received impetus !'ran her ~Xpanded trade with Gennany durinp;
the 1930s.
C. other Ba.lance of Paynents policies
Toward

the end of the 1920s the stock of British and United

States investmen ts of all kinds in Latin America aroounted, in per capita
tenns, to about one--sixth those in Ganada.

The heaviest concentra tion

occurred, in descending order and still in per capita tenns, in CUba,
Argentina , Chile, Mexico, Uruguay and Costa Rica. Both in Canada and
Latin America the two major foreign investors had accumulatea claims
of all kinds of around four t1mes the annuai value of merchandise
exports.

Assllning a five percent rate of return, profits and interests

of foreign capital must have accounted for about 20 percent of annual
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exp ort earn ings , and were pun ctua lly tran sfer
red abroad. With the
exce ptio n of Mexico, the ''investment clim ate"
appe ared reasonably good ;
the nine teen th century defa ults on bonds issu
ed 1n wndon had been
sett led .

\~tu.le nur.ierous .fric tion s were ~ne rate d by dire
ct 1nvest11lents,
t.11ey seemed nep;otiable •
and

unexpected post-1929 fall in dol lar and sterl
in.P: pric es
shar ply incr ease d the rea l cos t of exte rnal
obllP-ations denaninated in
ncr.rl.nal terms. Serviciru:1; the Argentine pub
lic deb t, for example, which
had absorbed about 6 perc ent of rerchan
d1se exp orts du r~ the late
1920s, by 1933 reached nea rly 16 perc ent of
exp orts . Chile in 1932
faced inte rest and amo rtiza tion charf?es, incl
udin g those on sho rt tenn
mat urit ies, far exceedinr; exp ort earninp;s.
'1he rati o of the stoc k of
lonr.; term .ext erna l pub lic debt to yea rly mer
chandise exp orts for all
Lati n America rose !'ran 1. 5 in 1929 to 2. 3 in
1935. The dryiros up of
foreif:'ll cap ital markets made roll-<>ver ope rati
ons for both lonp:-- and
sho rt~t enn debt very diff icu lt. The coll apse
of inpo rt duty revenues
cut a trad itio nal bu~ tar- ; source for pa.vm
ents on the exte rnal deb t.
Sta rtiM 1n 1J31 e.uthori ties delayed grantinp
; exchange to inpo rter s
for set tl~ the ir sho rt-te nn deb t and to fore
im canpanies for pro fit
rern ittan ces. Also 1n 1931, Iati n American cou
ntri es beP'Jll'} to skip scheduled
serv icin g of the exte rnal long -ten n pub lic deb
t, a"ld a !'ew yea rs late r
only Argentina, Dcr.r1nican Republic and Hai ti
were pun ctua lly payirus
inte rest s and amo rtim tion s on the ir deb t.
De!'aultinP; cou ntri es did not
dram atic ally repu diat e the ir obli p:at ions , but
asked foreif11 cred itor s
for con vers atio ns aimed at res che dul ~ and
rest ruct urin r, the deb t.
Dif fere nt cou ntri es carr ied out thos e con vers
atio ns with vari ous der;:rees
The

-15of enthusiasm.; Cuba, for example, while servicing her debt irre~arly
during the 1930s maintained better relations with her creditors than
Brazil, whose dealL~ t1. th creditors during the late 1930s, especially
with British ones, were acrimonious.

For many countries those nepptiations

were to stretch out well into the 194Qs, and into the 1950s :L"1 sane
cases.
The contra.st between Argentine and Brazilian policies toward

debt service in the 1930s casts sane light on the nature of international
econom:!.c relations during those years.

In merchandise accou.rit Brazil

traditionally had an export surplus with the United States and an import
surplus with the United Kin~om.

Arp;entina had an export surplus with

the United Kingdom, ar:d an 1Mport stu"!)lus with t:!"le '.Jn:1 ted States. Both
...the Argen~ine a11d Brazilian debts had becane diversi~ied during the 1920s,
but more than half were still held by British interests.
Argentina had an export surplus with a country organizinr; camr>n
wealth preferences, threateninr.: to impose bilateral exchanr-:e clearings,
and where fina11cial interests of the City still exerted P-;reat political
influence.

Australia, Canada and New Zealand ·were eager to replace

Argentina in British markets.

British pressures culr.linated in the Roca

Runciman treaty of 1933, several of whose features were not tmlH~e those
of 1930s econanic treaties between Ge~• and eastern European countries.
Under these circt.mStances, tampering with the nonnal servicing of the
Argentine debt would have involved not only a bruisinp: COI!ll'lercial clash
with the United Kingdon, but probably also a major restructurtng of the
~ntine dc:rnestic political scene, at the expense of groups linked
w1 th

An.P',lo ·Argentine trade.

'!he relative abundarice of exchange reserves

1n Jl.rgentina,- whose gold holdin.P.;s remained one of the hiE-"'hest in the world,
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gainin g an jr,por tant windf all by the increa se 1n the intern ationa
l p;old

price during the 1930s, plus the fact that a substa ntial anx>unt of
the .Argentine sterl ~- and dollar -denan inated debt was held by ~nti
nes
(just as a sha.""e of ''da.1estic", peso-d enanin ated debt was held by
foreir ;ners) also contri buted to punctu al servic ing of even dollar 
ciencr.rl.nated bonds, presumably roostly held 1n the United States , 1n spite
of Britis h hints about the convenience for Anglo --~nt1 ne trade of
defau lting on that part of the debt.

In contr ast, Brazil had an expor t surplu s with a country ccmJTiitted
to

mu1 tilate ral

trade plus conve rt1bil1 ty, a"ld where the New Deal viewed

financ ial intere sts with suspic ion.

United States expor ters to Brazi l

knew that an additi onal dollar spent in Rio for debt serviciru:!;, r.iair.ly
to Britis h 1."lter ests, would mean one less dollar for Brazil ian i.,:,or
ts
fran the United States (Braz il had run out of reserv es in 1930). The
Britis h could do little when faced by errati c Brazi lian debt servic e.
Fur":..hermore, during the second half of the 1930s there was preocc unatio
n
1n Washington with German influe nce 1n Brazi l, lea~ to even
nore tolera nt

views of Brazi lian debt servic e irregu lariti es. S1.M1lar Reopo litical
consid eratio ns also help explai n the relati vely mild response of the
Roosevelt admin istrati on to the 1938 Mexican oil nation alizat ions, the
bulk
of w~~ch damaged Britis h and United States inte!' ests.
There is little reason to doubt the concensus 8J'!Dn~ those who
have examined the Latin .Arerican defau lts of the 1930s: if the depre
ssion
had been mild, and if the steady expansion of world trade
and capita l nows
had been contin ued, defau lts would have been infreq uent and
could have

been settle d witho ut much diffic ulty.

Once depres sion came and produ ctive

resour ces were allowed to~ to waste 1n idlene ss, while cou.'1tr1es

-17eve::-.,,~...~ :,: rest:-icted !..~rts to protect Jots, it rrade no eco!lCr.'Jc sense
to insist

O!':

the t:!"'a..---.s~er of real resources as debt seMcin.c:.

!lo

doubt the capi ta1 r.m-ke";s of the 1920s contained si~fica"1t 1Mperfectio:1s:
durir.£ the 193Js nar.:: unde!"'\o."!'1 ter-s

we!'e

accused not ,1ust o~ negli~ence

in seet.:ir1('"'. ir.:'onnatio~ about bo!'!'Owers and their projects, but also of

deliberately r.J.sleadir.~ bond buyers, motivatinf!'. Nev.• !)eaJ. rer.i.u.a:or:;
ler,isla-:io:-1.

Lati!'1 A':!erica:i ccu:;tries were encourar.ed to borrow excessivel?,

a:id a good sha..""e of the f'unds went into projects of do~btful social
productivity.
were decisive.

But one may question whether these :n.icroeconoc,J.c !'actors

One may also note that the industrialized cour:tries

the.-nselves led i."1 the undennin1n.,. of belief in the sanctity of contracts;
exa':JT.les i.'1clude the B::--!tis~ de:'ault on the war det,t, Gennan._v 's ~ailure
to make payments on the greater part of her international oblip;ations, the
dero.r,ation of the p_:old clause in the United States, a""ld d<:r.i-:stic ~toria
le~islated in several cou.""ltries.
By the late 1930s foreim exc~~e availability had :1J!lproved and
indeed sane debt servici."4"". was paid by de!'aultinp; I.a.tin Al'!lericaT'J countries
throur-,hout the 1930s.

Sane countries pu..""Chased their own partially or

wholly unserviced bonds selling at a discou."'lt :1n foreign markets; those
bonds by the late 1930s were probably held mostly by speculators.

Such

''repatriations" of t~ debt avoided a rif?.d settleMent schedule at a
tine when the inte:rr.iational econar.ic outlook was ver-y uncertain, and
were carried out by Central Banks, whose financial positions were
generally better thc.r. tr1ose of the Treasuries, which still suffered !'ran
the fall and chan~ :in car;>esit1on of inports, a.."ld the induced decline
1n duties.

-18In spite of exchange contr ols regul ating profi t remit tance s

abroad by fore ~ enter prise s, direc t foreiJ;r,n investments occur
red
/
throuP:',hout the 1930s, al though 1n amounts roore simi fican t for
the
expansion of speci fic branches of production than for balance of
pa__vments
equ1U.bril1Tl.

It has been a.n,.ie d that ·the local reinvestment of forei m
enter prise profi ts may have been encouraged by l.imita.tions on rer:rl.
ttances
abroa d, an ~ n t nore plaus ible 1n the short than 1n the lomi;
run.
In sane co..mtries exchange contr ols were also employed to ward off
unwa."'lted short -tenn capit al 1nnow s, as in .ArP.entina durin g the
late
1930s; such "hot money'' movements were perceived as desta bilizi rw,
nacro 
econar.1c bala.'1ce. Capit al accanpany1np; European refiw.ees was consi
dered
a more pennanent and welcomed addit ion to local resou rces and these
canbi natio ns of entre prene urshi p

and

finance were inpor tant 1n the

expansion of sever aleco nanic (and cultu ral) activ ities in rnan_y
Latin
American coun tries.
D. Monetary and Fisca l Polic ies
declin e 1n expor ts and capit al inflows siF?:nalliW. the b e ~
of the crisi s was acccr.panied at once by balance of payments defic
its
which drain ed reser ves and noney suppl ies, according to ~ld-s tanda
rd, fixed
'!he

exchange rates rules . 'lbe expor t fall had ~rta .nt mult iplie
r effec ts.
This sectio n ~1.11 examine how those defla tiona ry press ures on agr:r
e~te
der.iand were contained

and

event ually rever sed.

In coun tries without

well-developed finan cial markets it is diffi cult to isola te purel
y fisca l
fran roonetary polic ies. OJrin g the 1930s only ~nt1 na
had finan cial
markets of sane soph istica tion, so this sectio n will discu ss ~
~te
macroeconornic polic ies witho ut esta.blishinP-; fine distin ction s betwe
en
nonet ary

and

fisca l ones.

-19Money supply data indicateI that reactive Latin American countries
show briefer or shallower post-1929 declines in ncrninal rooney supplies
than the United States.

By

1932 the Brazilian nom:1nal money.supply

exceeded that of 1929; the correspond1ne Colombian date is 1933.

The

end of convertibility into gold was helpful in stenming the loss of
liquidity among reactive countries.

In contrast, the Cuban inability

to break out of the then orthodox rules led to a roonetary denation
even greater than that of the United States.
Danestic price levels for 1930-3~ were below those of 1925-29
even in reactive countries, exceptin~ Chile, althou.,l:,h the decline appears
smaller for most reactive countries than that in the United States.
By 1935-39 price levels in those countries had mostly returned to about
1925-29 l~vels, with only Chile and Mexico clearly surpassinp; them.
Real money supplies 1n l930-3!J in most reactive countries were above
those for 1925-29; by 1935-39 real money supplies in Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Uruguay were substantially above 1925-29
levels.

The

Cuban real roney supply in 1935-39 was below that for

1925-29, and this probably was the case in man.y of the Central Araarican
and Caribbean republics.

This contrast St.lf"fl.,ests that the increase in

real money supplies of reactive countries was not just the result of
autcrnatic mechanisms of a.d..1ustment tri~red by the fall in the inter
national price level, but also the result of donestic policies.
Maintenance of liquidity was not s~ly a matter of ending

.

convertibility into ~ld or foreign exc~ at the old parities. Even
after the abandonnent of the F?Pld standard sone countries, such as
Argentina, shipped gold to service the external debt and sold sate
foreign exchange to stern currency depreciation.

Both measures cut the
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monetary base if orthodox practice s were followed.

But as early as

1931 South American roonetary authori ties adopted neasure s which would
have been regarded as unsound during the 1920s. 'lhus, the ~ntin e
l!caja de Conversion" whose only orthodox duty was to exc~ ~ld and
foreign exchange for dcr.est:1c currency at a fixed price, and vice versa,
starting in 1931 began to issue dcrnestic currency in exchange for
private cCJJJrercial paper, rely~ on nearly forr,otte n laws, and later
on even issued danestic currency against Treasury paper, which was
also accepted as pa__vment for gold sent abroad for oubl1c debt servicin g.
Young technoc rats :1n c ~ of Argentine m::>neta..-y policy success fully
resisted pressur es to "redeem'' the Treasury paper, recall t:ie new
currency issues, and return to the old parity. 'lhe Colanbian Central
Bank in 1931 for the first time engaged in direct operatio ns with the
•

public, discoun ting notes and lend:1n~ on the security of warehouse
receipt s. Oovernrrent bonds were purchased in 1 ~ quantit ies by the
Colombian Central Bank since 1932. In Cola.ibia, as 1n other reactive
countri es, s:t.~ce the introdu ction of exchange controls in 1931 interna tional

.

reserve s ceased to govern moneta..ry issue, which fran then on was pre
dcr..1nantly Wluenc ed by interna l conside rations of economic policy or
budgetary expediency.
The South .American and Mexican roonetar:, policie s started around

1932 were in sane ways a relapse into past 1nnatio nary propens ities,
a past which was to be exorcise d by the adoption during the 1920s of
gold starxiard rules and of orthodox budp,etary and monetary nechanisrns.
These nechanisms became popular in the re,;1.on during the second half
of the 1920s, often foll~ visits of foreis;n '!money doctors ."
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Memories of wild inflation under inconvertible paper during the late
runeteenth century, memories still fresh dur~ 1929-31, as well as
episodes of financial disorder as recent as the early 1920s, ha."lpered
and slowed down the adoption of m::>re self-assured and expansionist
monetary policies.

It should also be·remer.ibered that as late as the

first half of 1931 there were opt1mistic reports of an upturn in the
major industrialized economies.
In contrast with the United States, there are no reports of

widespread bank failures in reactive countries during the early 1930s.
Also in contrast with the United States, m::>netary aggregates fail to
reveal a flight into currenc:_1r and a1tra.y fran bank deposits; if an,vthing,
during the early st~s of the depression the opposite appears to have
occurred in Argentina, Brazil, Colonbia and Uruguay.
countries monetary authorities simply did not let
fears of rooral hazard to the winds.

r.ia.ny

In reactive

banks fail, casting

While rnora.toria on urban and rural

domestic bank debts were decreed in many countries (earlier than in
the United States), thus freezing banks' assets, conmercial banks were
supported in a number of ad hoc ways, not all of them conducive to
mainta.ininP, actual liquidity.

For example, in Brazil as early as October

1930 withdrawals of bank deposits were restricted by decree.

Redis

counting of cc:irmrercial banks' loans was also vigorously carried out by
Central Banks and institutions such as the Banco do Brasil and the Banco
de la Nacion Argentina. Unorthodoxy was sometimes cloaked by gestures
to the old financial practices; .Argentina claimed to have used profits
!'ran increases in the peso price of J:!;Old to create an institution which

supported c~rcial banks.
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finan cial 1rrpotency of passi ve coun tries ~, be illus trate
d
by the cont rasti ng experiences of Cuba and Mexico 1n their
tinker1nP;
with silve r for monetary and fisca l purposes. Both coun
tries h1t upon
'!be

the expe dient of issui ng silve r coins , which added to liqui
dity aro.
yield ed seignorag-e prof its to the treas ury, justi fyinr ; expe
nditu res.
Depending on the acceptance by the publ ic, both coun tries
planned to
issue pa.per notes backed by silve r stock s, incre asing seign
o:rage.
In Cuba. r.Ddest issue s were made durin g 1932-33, and 1n 1934 a
revolutio!1BrY
goverrrnent appeared to heral d a bold new roonetary system
independent of
the dolla r by planning new issue s and by makin g silve r pesos
full
lega l tende r for the disch arge of old as well as new oblig
ation s con
tract ed in dolla rs or 1n old Cuban ~ld peso s. Shor tly there
after a
mild fonn CJ'!' exc ~e contr ol was decreed. ForeiPJ"l banks
on the islan d
appa rentl y t:r.reatened to expo rt all dolla rs rran Cuba; capi
tal nir-..ht
followed. 'l'he govert1I!Ent caved 1n, lifti ng rathe r than expa'1
ding cont rols.
Only the le,:,:al tende r statu s of silve r for all cont
racts 1n such currency

of the 1934 refon n. Even a Cent ral Bank was to wait unti
l 1948.
Mexico, afte r sane dena tiona ry measures in 1930 and 1931
, adopted
early in 1932 expansionary polic ies, relyi ng main ly on issue
s of silve r
rema ined

peso s.

Cent ral Bank contr ol over ccmnercial banks was extended and
stren gthen ed. Foreign banlr.s threa tened to leave Mexico,
and as the
Mexican auth oriti es held finn, rost of them left. Mexican-<>
wned banks
took their place .

Carrpa.ipns were launched to convince the publi c to use
"silv er" pape r notes rathe r than coins ; remarkably, the share
of pape r
notes in the m:>ney supply jtmped dram atica lly 1n a few year
s, for reaso ns

still sanewhat obscure.

Publ ic banks were creat ed.o r expanded to finan ce
housing, publ ic works, forei'1;11 trade , indu stry and asi;ri cultu
re, and these

-23instruments were used with increasingly self-conscious expansionist
purposes.

By

the late 1930s the ~xican m:metary and financial system

was quite different fran that of the late 1920s.

In contra.st w1 th the

disastrous Chinese experience, Mexican reliance on a silver standard
did not p;enerate urrrianw;eable probl~ when the United States raised
silver prices; Mexico simply prohibited the export of silver rooney 1n
April 1935 and ordered all coins to be exchanged for paper currency.

A

year and a half later, after the world price of silver had fallen,
silver coinage was restored, partly due to pressure fran the United
States silver lobby.

As a major producer and exporter of silver, Mexico

of course benefitted from higher international silver prices.
Even during the confusion of the early 1930s, fiscal policy in
reactive qountries appears to have contributed to the maintenance of
ap:p;rep;ate demand, at least 1n the sense of not balancing the bud~t in
the midst of the crisis, in spite of the protestation of policy makers
that they :1ntended to do so.

Although data are particularly shaky in

this field, real ~venment expenditures were not significantly cut
during the early 1930s, while real tax revenues fell as mports collapsed,

inducing an increase in fiscal deficits in spite of new taxes and higher
tariffs.

The financing of budget deficits even 1n reactive countries during

the early 1930s was not all particularly expansionarJ; payment" delays to
civil servants and governrrent suppliers increased the "floatinp.; debt",
a debt whose holders could only turn into cash at huge discounts, thus caning
close to forced loans.

A fiscal policy, expansionary 1n the sense of

increas~ the full capacity real budget deficit durinp: the early 1930s,
has been doc'l.U'flented only for Brazil.

'Ihe

cases of Argentina

and

Brazil

will illustrate the variety of fiscal policies 1n reactive countries.

-24Real expe nditu res of the Argentine cent ral goverrment rose
1n
1929 and again in 1930; the prov ision al regim! of General
Uriburu, which
took power 1n September 1930 pledg ing to e11minate popu list
budgetary
exce sses, reduced 1931 real expe nditu res sligh tly below those
for 1930
but left them above 1929 leve ls. '!he .lowest real expenditu
re fiEnJ,res
for the 1930s,which were regis tered 1n 1933, t.iere still highe
r than
those for 1929; for the rest of the decade real governmen
t expe nditu res
expanded so that by 1938-39 they were around 50 perce nt above
1929. A
rnaj or

road- build ing progra~ was undertaken by the governnent of
General
Justo (1932-1938), a.ddinr.; 30,000 kilom eters of all-w eathe
r and improved
roads by 1938 to a system that had only 2,100 kilan
eters of such roads
1932. This program had 1111portant effec ts not Just on a,m,
e~te demand
but also 9n prod uctiv ity and am--egate supply, both conpleme
nting and
canp eting with the vast Argentine railr oad network. 'Ihe
late 1930s
:1.n

also

w1 tness ed

an expansion of milit ary expe nditu res. The ratio of'
all government expe nditu res to marchandise expo rts which
1n 1928 was
less than 0.4 had risen to ioore than 0.9 by 1938-39.
t.ec:ti.nocrats 1."l c~~ I; of the eeoncr.'lic polic ies of the Uribu
ru
and Justo admi nistr ation s, incl ud~ Federico Pined
o and Raul Preb isch,
took a dim view of the large defi cits regis tered :1.n 1930
and 1931; the
'Ihe

fall :1.n revenues rran impo rt dutie s aggravated a fisca l situa
tion which
alrea dy 1n 1928 and 1929 yield ed taxes coverjnp: only 76-80
perce nt of
all govel'"!lI?ent expe nditu res. Tari ff rates were :increased
, an 1ncane tax
was intro duce d (in 1932), a gaso line tax was coupled 'with
the roa.d.-building
prograr.i, and use was made of Jllll.tiple exchange rates to gene
rate govel"l'll'ent
reven ues. As :1.n othe r Latm American coun tries , fisca l heter
odoxy was
discr edite d :1.n ~nt 1na by dubious expenditures and lax
budgets durin g

the late 1920s.

-25'lhe budget deficits of 1930 and 1931 were financed primarily by

delays 1n payments to suppliers and civ.11 servants, or pa.,Wlents in public
debt instrumen ts of low liquidity , contribut ing to the unpopula rity or
govermient deficits. Starting in 1932, however, such float~ debt was
sharply reduced and by the second half of the 1930s the goverrunent placed
in an active local market both short- and long-term public securitie s
at rates of interest much below those of 1929-1932. Refunding operation s
were also carried out to reduce the cost and in;)rove the structure s
of domestic and foreign debts.
'Il1e countercy clical potency of AI'p;entine fiscal policy during the

early 1930s was reduced by the increased share in total expenditu res of
debt service payments, larF;elY ma.de to foreigner s.

All payments on the

, public debt reached 29 percent of expenditu res in 1932; this may be con'

trasted with the

mea.rre
5 oercent
devoted to oublic
works.
.
-

By

1938 the

figures were 15 percent for debt service and 20 percent for public works.
Other La.tin American countries were to find the bud.P:etary weiQ;ht of debt
service a strong inducerrent to suspend nonnal payirents.

In short, there is no evidence that during the early 1930s the
Argentine goverrment sought to increase the full capacity budget deficit
to canpensat e for the fall 1n aggre~te demand.

On

the contrary, attemnts

were ma.de to shift upwa.""d the tax schedule and to lower that for govern
ment expenditu res.

But even during the early 1930s efforts to reduce the

deficit induced by the decline 1n foreign trade and output were ~red
by either ca?J'!lOn sense or the sheer inability to cut expendittll"es and
raise taxes fast enough.

'Ihe relative siz.e of public expenditu res in

the incane stream thus r,-ew

b:, default already

to sustain econanic activity.

1n the early 1930s, helping

Since 1933 public experxiitures expanded in

a deliberat e way, and this expansion had at least balanced -budget-m ultiplier
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effe ct on the rest of the econaey.

In addi tion , sinc e 1935 the new

Cent ral Bank encouraged the expansion of a market for
the dane stic publ ic
debt , faci litat ing JTOdest defi cit finan cing . Fina lly,
the stru ctur e
of expend1.tures during the late 1930s on balance favo
red dane stic
expansion, in spit e of s~ incre ase 1n the 1n1:>ort
coot ent or m111tacy
expe nditu res.
Braz il provides an example of a coopensatory incre ase
in ~vernrnent
expe nditu re 1n the early 1930s. Since 1906 the state
of Sao Paulo and
the Fede ral Goverrment had atter :pted to sust ain coffe
e pric es via buff er
stoc ks; duri ng the sharp rece ssion of 1920-21 the coun
tercy clica l potency
of the coff ee valo rizat ion scheme had alrea dy been derro
nstrated. As
coffe e pric es fell d ~ the early 1930s the governme
nt ap.;ain purchased
larg e quan titie s of that prod uct. A F!:()Od shar e of
those purchases were
financed eith er by fore ign loans or r~w taxe s, but abou
t one- third were
financed esse ntia lly by money crea tion . It has also
been argued that the
new taxe s levie d on expo rts, or the rela tive exchanP,e
rate appr ecia tion
gene rated by fore ign loan s, in;>roved Braz ilian term
s of trade rela tive to
the relev ant coun terfa ctua l situa tion . Argentina also
start ed re~ at:in ~
the prod uctio n and expo rt of major trad ition al expo
rts durinP; the 1930s,
but with out the massive fisc al inpa ct of the Braz ilian
coff ee purc hase s.
exchange diff eren tial prof its were the ft..!'F;entine coun
terpa rt to the
Braz ilian expo rt taxe s, both atten ptin g to rais e @:OV
erment revenues as
well as to prot ect the terms of trad e. Braz il also
expanded publ ic
expe nditu res duri ng the late 1930s, and probably redu
ced the import cont ent
'!he

of thos e expend1t ures even toore than ~en t1.n a, as
be~n ning 1n September
1931 it met debt serv ice obli ~t1o ns only part ly.
In 1937 Braz il announced
the suspension of all debt servicinP'., and none occu
rred during 1938 and 1939.
In both Are:entina and Braz il the 1930s witn esse d
dive rsif1 catio n of publ ic

-27revenues,

w1 th

a remarkable expansion in non-custans taxes, which by

1932 (Argentina) and 1933 (Brazil) had exceeded the 1929 levels, at
current prices.

A s:1.m:1.lar trend toward tax diversification has been

reported for Colombia and Mexico.

In the Brazilian case state revenues,

especially those of Sao Paulo, appear_to have expanded by more than
those of the federal government.
Calamities, civil disturbal')ces a.'1d border wars during the early
1930s led to increased real public expenditures in several countries,
apparently financed directly by ITX)netary expansion.

Ex~les include

political tunooil .in Chile durinp.; late 1931 and 1932 (when that country
had a short-lived socialist p;overnment); the war between Peru and
Colombia over I.eticia in 1932 (partly financed on the Colc--::bian side by
voluntary ,donations); the second Chaco War between.Bolivia and Paraguay,
also .in 1932 and a severe drought 1n the Northeast, which added to
coffee deficits in Brazil (the former more than the latter).
Whatever the hesitations and in:provisations of the early 1930s,
by the second half of the decade the reactive Latin American countries had
developed a respectable

aJTay

of both ITX)netary and fiscal tools, as well

as the will to use them to avoid deflation.

'Ihus, the 1937-38 recession

in the United States was felt .in the foreign trade statistics rore than
those for industrial output.

South Arnerican countries damaged by the

loss of European markets and shipping shortages .in 1939-40 mobilized to
adopt emergency stabilization measures, such as the remarkable Plan Pinedo
in Argentina, which included proposals for closer regional econa:rl.c ties,
particularly between Arp;entina and Brazil.

'!hat Plan was never adopted,

due to Congressional opposit:!.on and an in:provement in the economic outlook.

-28In passive countrie s an act1Vi.st fiscal policy cootinued to be checked by
exiguous forei~ and danestic demand for public debt, and by convert ibility
into dollars at fixed rates that limited m:>netary expansion not backed
by

interna tional reserve s.
E. Other Policies

While nan1na1 exchange rate behavior dl.lring the 1930s is well
doc1JI1Ented, nuch less is known r e ~ wages and how they were influenc ed
by public policy, except for a few cases. In Guatemala, for ex~le ,
where the exchange rate fixed during the 1920s was maintained throughout
the 1930s, the regime of General Ubico enforced draconian labor practic es,

sane origina ting 1n the Spanish conquest, ~nerat i~ a cheap supply of
quasi-fo rced labor for both landowners and public works. Flexibi lity and
JOOQeration regardi.ng rooney W8.'reS lt."8.S induced by r.x:>re subtle means 1n other
'
countri es, particu larly where non-tra ditional labor markets already existed .
In sane of those countri es, like AN:ent1na, soft economic conditio ns during
the early 19,:;')s, rural-ur ban migratio n and cheap foodstu ffs kept increase s
in rxm1nal wages substan tially behind exchange rate dep~cia tions. In others,
such as Colombia,

~,-;11 ~nd

Mexico, those market trends Were accumpanied

by oublic policie s encourap-;ing trade unions which often controll ed from

above rather than praoc>ted
finns.

WaP-;e

gains, especia lly Vi.s-a-vis na.tionally-o"'ined

Mass deporta tion of Mexican workers rran the United States during

the 1930s also added to the pool of nobile labor availab le :1n that country .
Public policie s went beyond those seeking short tenn adjustment to
outside shoclr.s, and Latfn Amer1can govenr. ents, whose attactne nt to la1ssez 
ra1re was never particu larly deep, became increasi ngly ccmnitted during
the 1930s to praix>ting long-ten n l?'_;rOWth and structu ral transfon nations .
'lhe Lazaro Cardenas adminis tration (1934-1940) accelera ted the land

re!'onn program of the Mexican Revolution, and 1n 1938 nationa .11~ the

-29petroleum industry.

GoveI"JTllent regulatio n of the pricing and marh-etinp.:

of rural products, and of public utility rates expanded 1n rost countries .
As noted earlier for Mexico, the 1930s witnessed 1n several other Iatin
American countries the strenf'the ning a11d creation of public institutio ns
granting iredium and lol"l.P;•tem credits; which the unregulat ed financial
markets of the 1920s had not prov:tded in amounts re~ed as suffic•i ent,
or ·whose supply had been left 1n foreim hands.

Housin,r;, public works,

agricultu re and, 1.ncreasinr'.,ly, industry benefitte d fran such credit, which
durinr, the 1930s: when inflation was moderate at worst, was still priced
not far below plausible estimates for the shadow cost of capital.
The public works undertaken in rnan..v cou.11tries had a long-lasti rw,
:L'Tlpact on productiv e capacity and Ul"ba'11zation patterns. Vast road
pror,rar:is accelerat ed the transitio n .!'ran the railroa d~ to that of
motor verJ.cles.

'Ihat transitio n stimulate d man,,, rnanufacturinp.; activitie s

includiru; cement, rubber, petroleum refininp.: and the assenbl; ,~ and
eventual producticm of cars, trucks, and buses; generated puhlic revenues
Via gasoline truces; diversifi ed and canpleted transport networks, lowerin~
their costs and encouraginr: new activitie s, such as United States tourism
in Mexico, while opening up new lands for rural productio n; and even
helped to c~e internati onal econanic relations , as motor vehicle
activitie s were dcrn1nated

by

the United States, wh:He railroads had been

dor.unated by the United Kingdan.

Irrigatio n works, like those undertake n

in Mexico, together with new roads and credit facilitie s, encouraSsed

the transitio n fran tradition al to modern capitalis t agricultu re; the
construct ion of a network of ~ n elevators 1n Ar!:;ent1na in;)roved the
barp;aininr, power of farmers.
Juriru?;

the 1930s governnents and public opinion showed a keener

interest in increasirl r: the national share in value added b:v foreip:n-owned

-3O
acti vi ties a."ld the control over the processing and rnarketir,r,; of exports.
Foreign-owned enterprises came under closer scrutirw and supervision
by host countries; several traditional export activities witnessed a

rise 1n the share O\\ned by danestic capitalists, as in the case of
Cuban s1.1P';il'. Finally, as the European and Asian political scenes con
tinued to deteriorate, the Armed Forces, especially in South America,
showed increased interest in prcF.Dting the expansion of certain types
of infrastructure, and the local manufacture of steel and annanents.
IV. PERFOJNANCE

Even in countries perfornirs; reasonably well during the 193Os,
structural chan~s were more ir.Jpressive than overall J:9:'()'t.th; during that
decade sor_E econanic activities stamated or collapsed while others
s~d a.head.

The

former were p;enerally associated d:!.rectl:v c!" indirectly

with external markets, wr..ile the latter typ1call~, involved danest1c
sales.

~eactive countries performed better than passive ones, and in

both tj!pes of nations sane reM.ons did much better :than athers.

Pockets

of profit.ability withi.11 agricultu...""e and !nni:stl'"'J coexisted with liquidations;

textile mills worked three shifts even in 1932 while meat-packinr' plants
and s ~ mills were idle. 'lbe larger the pre-1929 share of exports in
total output, the smaller the absolute size of the danestic r.arket, and
the greater the institutional baITiers to danestic resource oobility,
the roore difficult it was for the ~-rur. sectors to daninate the
shrinY.ing ones to yield a reasonably ~ . overall perfonnance.

In what

follo\o:s ar;gregate performance will first be examined as far as data allow,
turn~ later to sectoral and welfare perfonnances.

-31A. Macroeconanic Performance

----
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Nation al accoun ts for the four larp,es t Iatin .Atrerican countr ies
(Argen tina, Brazil , Colanbia and Mexico) rep,ist er growth rates for Gross
Danest ic Proouct (GDP) steadi er and hlJ•·,her than those of
United States for 1929-1939.

C8nada and

the

Neithe r.the absolu te GDP growth nor its

level relativ e to the p;rowth achieved durinr-: the 1940s and early 1950s,
however, are impres sive, ranging f'rorn around 2 percen t per annum for
Argent ina and Mexico, to about
coffee countr ies.

1.i

percen t per annum for the two maJor

ArP-;entine and Colombian GDPs grew during the 1920s

at clearly faster rates than those of the 1930s; Brazil ian G!)P durinv,
1919-1929 also seer:is to have outperformed the 1929-1939 expans ion.
Measurements of GDP imore losses of real inccme from deterioratin-'2:
terms of trade. Taking these losses into account would reduce Brazil ian
'
arnual P-;rowth for 1929--1939 by about one perce n~ point (while

increas ing those for the 1920s and 1940s) .

Popula tion ~wth in !.a.tin

.A.,erica durinr: the 1930s \\ras higher than that in indust rialize d countr ies.
Thus, reasuri nf; perfonnance hy ~wth in ~ £¥.1 ta real dcrnestic income
durinv 1929-1939 would reduce the differe ntial favorin g reactiv e La.tin
American countr ies ccrnpared with indust rialize d countr ies. Correc tinr
for the reducti on in factor payments abroad which occurre d durirw, the
1930s, to obtain real nation al income, is unlike ly to offset correc tions
I

for ternlS of trade and popula tion in evalua ting overal l perfonn ance.
Even for reactiv e countr ies data for these calcula tions are shaky, however,
and for others they are genera lly unavai lable.

In reactiv e countr ies GDP recove ry appare ntly started in 1932,
earlie r than in the United States .

Neithe r the 1929-32 decline nor

the 1932-37 recovery were as dramat ic as those in the United States .

-32Consur.ption and investment also show disparate behavior 1n their
canponent parts,
value.

mak1.np.

the use of those ~rates of only 11m1ted

Investr.ent shares 1."1 GDP seem to have declined relative to the

late 1920s, yet sare sectors expanded their productive capacity while
others experienced net disinvestment. . Inports of machinery and equipnent
for railroads and electricity waned, while those for scr.e rnanufacturini;.,:
activities rose.

It would strain available data to discuss the

evolution of national sav1ngs during the 1930s relative to the 1920s,
but it is clear that they rose relative to exterru:.l sav:1.ns;.'",S, and it seems
that chanr;es in the danestic financial system and in J!.C)vennent budgets
enco~d their roobilization.

Private consurrption must have also

under~ne sicnificant structural charw.es after 1929, sane renectinQ; oruz:oine:
long--tem ,trends such as urbanization and the adoption of new products,
others induced in the short- and rned1um-tem by the !ncOI!le and substitution
effects of hi~r prices for imported

F!,'OC)ds.

B. Sectoral Performance
Econanic perfonna.nce d ~ the 1930s for the reaot1ve I.a.tin American
countries looks more impressive when attention is focused on manufacturiri.J?:.
While growth in this sector during the 1940s a"ld early 1950s was to exceed
that for the 1930s in roost countries, manufacturinP, growth rates for
1929-39, rang:i.ng .fran rore than 3 percent per annum 1n Arr:entina to roore
than 8 percent per annum in Colanbia, far outstripped those of the lnited
States and Canada, which hovered around zero. 'Ihe relatively nooest
Argentme rnanufact~ exnansion was hii:r.her than that of Australia, even
thou,c;h

both countries experienced roughly s1m1lar GDP growth rates between

1928 and 1938. In the jnportant Brazilian case, manufacturing growth durin!!
the 1930s, of rore than 6 percent per annum, was significantly hi~r than

-33during the 1920s; Colanbian industria lization in the 1930s could not have

been much behind the pace of the 1920s, if at all.

Another interestin f:;

cooparison involves Chile and Uruguay, on one side, and CUba, on the
other; the fonner reactive countries ~xperienced manufacturing expansion
of 3 to 5 percent per annum, while the latter country saw its total
industria l productio n shrink even more than in the United States.
Pre-1929 Latin Amarican manufacturing tended t o ~ only slightly
ahead of the rest of the export-le d econorcy.

Beyond m:xiera.te protectio nism,

public policy departed 11ttle !'ran neutralit y to\s:ard industry.

Inportant

seFJ1}'ents of manufacturing exported (slightly ) processed primary products;
exarrples include rreat-packirw.'. plants and flour r.r!.lls in the PJ.ver Plate
ands~ mills in several countries , wrJ.ch also sold their products
domestic ally.

Growth of manufacturing durinr-.: the recovery phase of the

1930s relied heaVily or. in;:>ort substitut ion, defined in the usual accountin g
sense (decrease in t:!'le share of inported goods 1n total supply), which
!'ocuses on output rather than on installed capacity.

Manufactl.l?'irn

during the 1930s grew :1n reactive countries much faster than GDP, in
contra.st with pre-1929 experienc e.
'Ihe uneven performance 1n various GDP carrponents is echoed by

heterogeneous growth within rnanu~acturinp:.

Activitie s tied to pre-1929

export-or iented prosperit y shrank, while others (sanet~ s a handful)
ma.de dramatic output advances.

Leading sectors typically included textiles,

petroleum refining, tires, phannace uticals, toiletrie s, food processin g
for the hare market (e.g., vegetable oils), chemicals , cement and other
building materials .

Cotton and wool textiles were the most inportant

leading sectors, often proViciirlg more than 20 percent of the net expansion

of value added 1n manufacturing, and growi ng at annual rates above
10 perce nt. Between the late 1920s and late 1930s, cement produ
ction
multi plied by 100re than 14 times 1n Colanbia, by ioore than 6 times
1n Brazi l and by al.roost 4 times 1n Argentina.

Even in passi ve coun tries

one Nnds sone impo rt-sub stitut ing ~ust ries r;rowing very fast,
such
as milk- proce ssing and cotto n cloth 1n CUba, but 1n the midst of
depressed expo rt-rel ated rnanufacturinr;. 'Ihe remarkable jndus triali
zatio n
of najor coffe e count ries (Braz il and Colanbia) was partl y due
to
pre-1929 manufacturin"'. secto rs with few direc t links to expo rts,
1n contr ast w1 th Argentina and Cuba. Pre-1929 growt
h, and the
indus triali zatio n it had induced, were the ioore helpf ul to the
inpor t
subst itutin g drive of the 1930s the great er the exten t to which
socia l
haVin g

overhead ~apit al, trame d labor force , and other produ ctive capac
ity which
had been creat ed were not rigid ly tied to speci alize d needs of
exportinr-:
activ ~ties and could be reallo cated ~uicy.ly to serve other orodu
ctive
purposes.
Output growth in the

boomi ng

indus trial secto rs far outst rippe d

tr..e ell.1)ar7Sion oi total dooes tic absor ption of those rnarn.1.~actur
ed goods ,
which eithe r followed more close ly the scr.ewhat sl~ sh growth
of GDP,
or decli ned 1n sane cases even in react ive coun tries. Apparent
domestic

cement consUl'Tption, for exanp le, incre ased by far less than the
spect acula r outpu t incre ases noted earli er; it rose by 26 perce
nt 1n
Colanbia~ 12 perce nt .in Bra.zil,and 50 perce nt 1n Argentina (in
the
United State s it decli neq by 36 perce nt, 1n Ganada and Haiti by
50 perce nt,
and in CUba by 63 perce nt). Exports expla in littl e
of the gap between
high outpu t and low dares tic absor ption expansion; the share
or local
produ ction 1n daies tic absor ption of cement rose between the late
1920s

-35to the late 1930s fran 6 to 72 percent 1n Colanbia, f'ran 14 to 89 percent
1n Brazil, and fran 35 to

94 percent

1n Argentina.

In contrast, 1n

CUba, Haiti, the Dcm1n1can Republic and Central America the share of
danestic output 1n national cement absorption c ~ d ver-y little durinp:
that decade (althoU,f",h the Cuban share .had reached levels hiJ."'.,her than
those of South American coW1tries 1n the late 1920s). A sim1lar import
substitution tale applies to textiles.

For other camxxlities, such as

autanobiles, the decline 1n imports could not be matched by expansion
of local production; for those goods, pr:1marily constnrer durables
and machinery and equipnent, domestic absorption fell, not to recover
1n per capita terms until the 1960s in rnan..v cases.

Capacity in manufacturirw, and ancillary social overhead capital
expanded QY less than output duriM; the 1930s; statistics do not shm-~
either an upsurge 1n inports of machinery and equipnent nor a coopensatinp; '
expansion of local production of those goods.

Indeed, 1n scr:e countries

in:ports of certain types of machinery (e.g., textile machinery in Brazil)
were banned based on allep.;ations of excess capacity.

~elate 1920s

left substantial slack or malleable canacity in industry, electricity
and sane transport facilitles.

'Ihere are frequent reports of textile

mills increasing their number of shifts during the early 1930s, and of
large investnents made during the late 1920s coming to fruition during
the 1930s, as in the Brazilian cement industry.

Electricity capacity

oriented toward export-related production during the 1920s could fairly
easily be switched to supplyinP; booming in;>ort substitutiru; activities.
Nevertheless, output expansions such as those rer-,istered for cerent in
~ntina, Brazil and Colanbia must have relied on

SOI"le

capacity, and imports of machinery and equipnent.

One may con..1ecture

increases in

-36tha.t there were substa ntial chanees 1n the carpos1t1on and allocat ion of
capita l goods inports between the 1920s and 1930s, so even if their
total fell, plenty cf room was left for the investment needs of dynamic
branches o!" rnanufacturinr;.
indust rializa tion of the 1930s, at least 1n South America,
was quite labor-i ntensiv e, and involved many small- and medium-sized
'1he

finns.

Between 1930

and

1937 indust rial enployrnent 1n

Sao

Paulo grew

at nearly 11 percen t per year. '!he output elastic ity of employment
was about one in both Argentina and Brazil ; increas es 1n averaRe labor
produc.t1vity for specif ic activi ties seem to have been rare, in spite
of the entry of new fonns.

In ~ntin a, for e.xaJ'Tl')le, the increas e in

the ntlr.lber of textile fin:15 accounted during the 1930s for aporoxima.tely

65 percen t• of the increas e 1n spindle s held by the indust ry.
There are other indica tions that 1nport -substi tution relied
heavily on new nation al and foreii:i;n-born entrep reneur s, 1nclud1nir fresh
ininigrants from the trouble d Europe of the 1930s. 'lhe rise of Hitler
and Franco led to si~fic ant gains of human and financ ial capita
l for
La.tin America.

'!here was also direct foreip;n investment 1n irnport

substit utioo by tariff- jurrp~ enterp rises, whose heme markets showed
weak prospe cts. For sectors like tires and cement these investments and
the technolOQT they supplie d provided simff1 cant inpetu s. '!here is
little system atic evidence on the overal l financi.nr; of manuf actur~
investm mt during the 1930s. It

may be

corJec tured that traditi onal

source s, e.g., reinves tm!nt of ~ss profits _

and

short-t erm and infonna.1-

market borro ~ supplie d the bulk of finance for nation al entrepr eneurs
as the contrib ution of public credit institu tions to manufacturing
capita l fonnati on was still m::>dest.

-37New jnport-substitu ting activities clustered, not surprisinp;ly,
ma.1nly around major consurn1~ centers, such as Buenos Aires, Mexico

City and Sao Paulo. While industrializati on thus contributed to support
ongoinr; urbanization trends, the latter appear to have had a d..vnamism
of their own, making one skeptical of_any close short-tenn links between
the two phenomena.
In;>ort substitution was the engine of growth during the 1930s, but
not just in manufacturing.

'lhe rural sector also witnessed gains 1n

the production of goods sold 1n the domestic narket relative to those
nrirnarily sold abroad. Food-~rtjng countries, such as those in the
Caribbean and Central Anerica, engaged in either modest in;)ort replaceITEnt,
as 1n Cuba, or m::>re ambitious, if truculent, efforts as 1n Guatemala.
Countries,which during the 1920s imported beverages and cooking oils,
like Argentina, turned to danestic substitutes duri~ the 1930s.

Cotton

textiles in;)orted dur:inf:, the 1920s were replaced partly by value added
., ..

in expanding local production o!' cotton, which later led to exports.

In contrast with import-replacem ent 1n industry, nuch of ~icultural
1.nvurt-substit ution w-as at the expense of intra.-Lat1I1 Ai"ii::rican tr-ade,

e.g. , Argentine production of yerba mate was at the expense of :imports
f'ra'l Paraguay.

Agricultural import-substitu tion naturally had a greater wei$t
1n overall grO"wth in the smaller, less-developed countries.

land was

an appa.""ently malleable ··1nsta1led capacity" which could be turned :r.r-cr.i
export cash-crops to production for either the local market or subsistence,
and could also be expanded using 11ttle foreip;n exc~.

'!he ease of land

reallocation and expansion depended partly on tenure arrangements
and asi;ronomic characteristics of export crops.

'Illus, it appears that

the presence of foreign-owned plantations in Cuba and Central Anerica

-38reduced, cete ris pan.bus, nex ibil 1ty 1n land use,
while land s plan ted
w1th coff ee were ph,ysicall..v roore rece ptiv e
to shar1np: thei r space with
othe r crops than those plan ted with bananas or
sugar cane. (An iden ti
fica tion problem exis ts as the latt er were ofte
n produced 1n fore im
owned plan tatio ns and the fonner by loca l fann ers)
. As noted earl ier,
all type s of rura l production were encouraged by
new irrir ,atio n works,
feed er road s, cred it faci litie s and pric e support
prop;rams. Pub licly 
sponsored agri cult ural rese arch programs also had
inpo rtan t payo ffs
duri ng the 1930s, as 1n the case of Bra zilia
n cott on.

Import subs titut ion extended to serv ices ; those
of fore ien labo r
and cap ital were to a larg e exte nt repl aced with
lo~ inpu ts or dispensed
with , while it 1s like ly that many ~nt ine s subs
titut ed visi ts to
Bari loch e and Mar del Plat a for vaca tion s in Pari
s. .AJooM expanding
sect ors one can also find , espe cial ly 1n reac tive
coun tries , sane producing
nan- trad ed good s and serv ices usin g rela tive ly
few imported inpu ts, such
as con stru ctio n, housing, and governnent.
leve l of inpo rts and expo rts refl ecte d prim arily
exogenous
shocks and tren ds, but thei r stru ctur es responde
d to the diff erin g sect oral
perfon!lances desc ribe d above. '1be shar es 1n tota
l ~r ts of consurrer
The

1ntenned1ate prod ucts like cement and text iles
fell , whil e thos e
for rret allu rgic al and othe r inte nned iate prod ucts
rose . Machinery and
equipment in;>orts go~ to exp ort- rela ted nsnu fact
urin g and to soci al
good s and

overhead faci litie s which had expanded duri ng the
1920s fell , while thos e
~in g to 1Jq:>ort-substitut1ng J?B nufa ctur
~ rose . Export bill s also
underwent changes, part ly because of the coll apse
of trad itio nal exp orts ,
but also due to expo rtab le sl.ll,:>luses gene rate d
by expandir"U? acti viti es,
such as ArP-;entine frui ts and Bra zilia n cott on.
'lburism also becam:! an

-391mportant non-trad itional Mexican export durinr; the 1930s. Export
di versifica tion extended to rer,ional oriP-'.in w1thin the country (Rio

Grande do Sul in Brazil and Rio Negro 1n Argentina ererr.,ing as exporting
areas) .• and to their r;eo~hic al destinati on • w1th Ge:rman.y becominr; an
expandin;; market for many La.tin Anerican exports.

New markets and

hig.11er exports for one La.tin ~rican country often meant a loss 1n
tradition al eX]")Orts for another; tht:·, Colcrnbia and Central .America
gained shares 1n the internati onal coffee market at the exnense of
Brazil; Venezuela n oil advanced replacing Mex:1 can crude; bananas !'ram
Honduras took the place o!' Color.tbian ones; and a larp.:e nt1r.1ber of countries
nihbled at Cuban

Sl,lP'.ar

hef!;errnnv.

C. Welfare Performance
.Since colonial times it has been noteci that a boan 1n Latin
American larr.. intensive exports may r.ot 1mnrove the welfare of lower1nccne groups, as during booms nrices of locall:1 produced foodstuff s
rose sharply, and access to land became more difficult .

\,There coercive

labor systens ·were applied, beans meant longer and roore intense workln"'.
hours.

Busts frequentl y led to cheaper hone

-p.:rown

foodstuff s. a [.Teater

ava.!labil it:, o!' land for subsisten ce crops , and slacker workinF-"; rei::.J.r.es .
One ray con.1ectur e that part of these ancient effects trere still visible

1n the 1930s .: for those employed 1n reasonabl y competiti ve labor markets

it is likely that real wases 1n tenns of foodstuff s rose, even as they
fell 1n terms of ir';>ortabl e P'.()C)ds.

Access to rural land 1n ~v countries

appears to have beccr.ie easier and cheaper for lower-- and middle -income
r,roups, as the opportun ity cost for land held h:V exporters declined and
plantatio ns were parcelled .

These market trends were carried further 1n

Mexico by a ma.1or land refonn., while 1n Colcrnbia and Cuba milder public
r.ieasures also pointed in the same direction , increasin r: the tenure
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security of lower-in cane f'arrrers.
Primari ly coercive labor systems survived into the twentiet h
century in several Latin .Ar.erican localiti es where descendants of
American indians were concent rated, such.as Bolivia , Peru and Central
Am?rica, coexist1nr- with freer labor arranii:ements.

n.irirw; the 1930s

1n Guatemala roads and public works were built usiru! coerced Indian

(and convict )labor, as had been the case under the lef':Uia dictator ship in
Peru. 'Ihe develop nental ar.ibitions of General Ubico went ap;ainst the
r:eneral ization ljnking busts with slacker labor rep:imes.
In the more \.ll"banized countrie s where t'ree labor systems pre
dominated, at least 1n the cities, open unerrployment seems to have been
rare after the initial years of the crisis.

A lack of stroru,: insti

tutiona l i,aIT1ers to do\o.nward. nr::me~J wa?.e flex1bil 1ty and a rapid end
to imnir:ration contribu ted to the elininat ion of open unel'T;)lo:mient ~
dur1nr;: the early 193:Js nanv European inJniP.rants returned to their old
countrie s, and scrnc recent arrivals to urban centers returned to their
rural tirthpla ces.

In Guba the seasona l ir.porta tion of J8l:laica'1 and

other West India."l labor for the sugar harvest was el:1r.11na.ted.

Neverth eless,

the welfa.-roe consequences of the crisis appear worse in Guba than 1n some
Central American countrie s which had lan,;er a.'1d rore flexible subsiste nce
sectors .
On the whole, 1."lcane and wealth distribu tion during the 1930s

appear buffette d by contrad ictory influenc es.

Groups linked to traditio nal

exports JTDJSt have seen their relative and even absolut e position decline .
Entreore neurs 1n ir.lport-substitutinp.; a.t'Ticulture and industry J'!D.lst have
accunw.ated handsane profits , with their output fetch.1.nr, hil",h danestic
prices while labor and raw materia l costs were unusual ly low. Entre
preneur s who had inherite d excess capacity !'ror!! the 1920s were especia lly

-41fortunate , recetving unexnected capital gains. H1M- and middle-c lass
families, with budg;ets havinp; low shares for foodstuff s and hi~ shares
for inported cons'IJl'lEr eoods~ faced unfavorab le relative price trends.
Beloved durable goods, such as autornopi les, or European vacations
beca'iE very expensive , and their consl.ll'llption often was to be postponed
for many years.

For lower incare groups, whether urban or rural, it

is 1.mlikely that real incare gains in tems of foodstuff s could have
been very substanti al; the best p.;uess is that even in reactive countries
perfornun r. reasonabl y well by the late 1930s real wag-es for unskilled
and sem:i skilled labor, takinp.; into account all ccrr;,onents of their
cons~tio n basket, were no higher than a decade earlier.

11ains in

employment security arisinr-: from new labor ler;islati on were limited to
pockets in the labor force and of m:x,t siPnifica nce even for them.

':he

tax refoms carried out in several countrtes were m:>re important for

public revenue raising and diversifi cation than for sir,n1fica nt chanr;es
in incom? distribut ion.

Perhaps with the exception of Mexico, the 1930s

did not witness a discontin uity 1n the inherited trends for nublic
services i.'1 education and health.

Secular improvements in literacy a"ld

health indicator s appear to have continued without obvious leaps nor
retardati ons, seerninr--l:1 following more the slurrr,ish urbanizat ion trends
than the vagaries of import substitut ion.
V. A CONCllJDI: ·lG I:'ll'ERRE:'ATION

Much of the evolution of Latin JIJrerican economies durin~ the 1930s,
particula rly the coexisten ce in reactive countries of viP;Orousl:v growing
branches of agricultu re and manufacturinr; with declininf': or staP.J1cll1t
foreipn trade, can be explained as a respor.se to incentive s created by

-42poli cies ~ d pr1mar1ly at cor1inp:

w1 th

bala."lce of p~ nts d1se quil ibr1 a

gene rate d by the unexpected worseni.rus or the terr.i
s or trad e and the
abru pt cess atio n of cap ital 1nno ws. As it becam
e clea r that the new
con stel latio n of exte rnal and dan estic rela tive
pric es were not nee tirW
phencrnena, and that the inte rnat iona l ·ec o~r was
not to retu rn to the
pre 1929 rule s of the

fr,aJTe,

both prlv ate

a'1d

pub lic ap:ents reor ient ed

thei r prod ucti on and investment :nlans.
Admittedly 1ncooplete evidence appears to supp
ort the view that
coun tries wil lw and able to forc eful ly devalue
thei r ex c~ rate
earl y 1n the decade moved toward the new patt ern
of accurrulat1on rore
spee dily than thos e nati ons wh.1ch kept thei r exch
an~ rate fixe d or
devalued slir- ,htly . For the latt er type o~ coun
try, the requ ired deflati ona ry' proc ess involved the marking down of
a mvriad of non- trad ed
goods pric es (and wa.E-";es) with out clea r
ruid ance frcr.l eith er markets or
r;overnrrents as to what the corr ect new leve 1 shou
ld be. '1he confusinP'
circ\.UTlStances of the 1930s, whose macroeconor.i:1.cs
are debated even toda y
1n indu stria lize d coun tries , made gues sing
about the new equi libri um
non- trad ed goods pric es s1nf!Ularly diff icul t.
In con tras t, devaluiru;
the exchanp.'e rate involved a clea r si,rna.1 and
a spec ies of "pri ce r,uid elin e 11 ,
reducinr, unce rtain ty for econcrnic av,ents 1n reac
tive coun tries .
,
As deva luat ions typi call y occu rred whil e
expo rts of r,oods and
serv ices exceeded 1Irports of goods and non -fac
tor serv ices (i.e ., excl udir u;
rem ittan ces of pro fits and inte rest s abro ad),
thei r expansionary effe cts
were stre ngth ened . Note also that purc has~ -pow
er-p arity should not
be expe cted to hold 1n an economy subj ecte
d to real shocl:s, so it 1s
not surpr1s1np.: that the nom1nal deva luat ions of
the 1930s, 1n cont ra.st
with thos e occu rrmr : 1n La.tin America sinc e Worl
d War II, were offs et

only to a slight degree by movements in danes tic price levels . Plent
iful
idle resour ces, of course , contri buted to this outcan e. Cne may also
conjec ture that 1n severa l reacti ve count ries during the late 1920s an
unusu ally large inflow of·for eip;n capita l financ ing d.ores tic public works
had result ed 1n what during the 1970s-became known as "atras
o carnbiario 11 ,
i.e., a low price for dollar s and sterl ~ and a

hip-.,h

price for non-tr aded

servic es, which made the real depre ciatio ns of the early 1930s
the more drama tic. 'Il1e late 1920s may have also left a le~acy of

p;oods and

plent iful liquid ity in scrne count ries, cushioninp: the impact of the
crisis .
abandonment of the old pariti es and of unlim ited conve rtibili ty
into foreig n exchange allowed 1n severa l count ries the maintenance and
'Il1e

expan sion,o f domestic liquid ity, which combined with other polici es led
to the reason ably good economic performance in reacti ve count ries.
'!be
balanc e of payments crisis and the threat of financ ial collap se were
of
greate r signif icance in the adopti on of those polici es than whether
the new governments which came to power during the 1930s repres ented
a
shift to the Right , as in ~ntin a., or toward more refon nist positi ons
as in Colcmbia and Mexico.

Purely dcrnestic politi cal factor s may have

accounted for whether or not a cou..1"ltry e ~ in land reform during
the 1930s, but those factor s had nn.ich less to do in reacti ve count ries
with the adopti on of polici es which induced in;x>rt subst itutio n. The
latter depended on the magnitude of the forei ~ excham;e and financ ial
crisis , and on-cou ntry specif ic chara cteris tics of the extern...al sector
.
'lhus, revolu tionar y Mexico was more timid r e ~ exchanp:e contro l
than
conse rvativ e Argen tina, largel y because of its open borde r with the
United States . Policy makers who abandoned gold conve rtibili ty, allowe

d

---'~4the exchange rate to depreciate supported banks at the edge of bankruptcy,

permitted budget deficits induced by econanic and foreign trade decline,
and f.1nanced them by monetary expansion, on the whole did so moved by
survival instincts rather than inspired by the writings of ecooanists,
either defunct or live.

But 1n reactive countries, including Chile

and U ~ , the institutional structure was ccr.patible with actions

involving a degree of policy autonany, while 1n smaller or passive
countries, such as Cuba, it was less so.
While the economic perfonnance of reactive countries was reasonably
good, per capita real 1ncanes grew less d ~ the 1930s than during

the 1920s or 1940s. P.ad the industrialized countries maintained full
ertl)lo~mient, open markets for forei~

~

and

bonds, and a peaceful

international envirornent, it is likely that the a~p.-,a,te output
perfonnance 1n reactive countries (and of course 1n ~sive ones) would
have been better. Sectoral patterns of. ,:,;rowth would have been different,
and it is conceivable that under such counterfactual circumstances

sane activities, like cenent and textiles, would have grown.less than
they actua 1ly did durinR the 1930s.

Tne d1 ve:rsificatioo which took

place :m agriculture, manufacturing, exports and r,ovemr.ent revenues,
as well as 1n the geographical sources and dest1nat1on of exports,
could very well have been less under the hypothesized counterfactual
conditions.

It is also conceivable that institutional refonns 1n banld.ng,

taxation and even land tenure would have been weaker.

Under the

counterfactual circumstances there mi~t have been less structural change
but oore growth not just 1n aP,gregate output but also 1n ph._vsical and
technical capacity.

Output growth during the 1930s wore out nuch of

the capital stock accumulated during the 1920s and earlier, and was

I

j

-45accoopanied by relat ively little fresh investment and techn ical
change.
At the outbr eak of World War II, a good share of the Iatin .Aneri
can
socia l overhead capit al and indus trial capac ity was alread y stretc
hed
thin and at the verge of obsol escen ce; war short ages were to aggra
vate
these condi tions .
crisi s at the Center did j,nduce polic y exper inent ation 1n
the Perip hery. Bold foreig n exanp les were plent iful: the New
Deal in
The

the United State s; fascism in Italy and later in Gennany and Spain
;
and radic al socia lism in the Sovie t Union. Exarrples of a succe
ssful
maintenance of old-fa shion ed orthodoxy were fe\\ier. 'Ihe colla
pse of
inter natio nal finan cial markets encourap:ed atten pts to mbil ize
dOMestic
savin gs and the creat ion of new dones tic finan cial instit ution
s. 'Il1e
lamen table state of banks in the Unite d State s and other indus
triali zed
coun tries during: the early 1930s made Iatin .Americans think twice
about
the ~rlsdarn of capit al fligh t, incre asing the potency of danes
tic roonetary
and tax

polic y.

Rival ries among indus triali zed coun tries, exace rbate d

by the crisi s, plus the Good Neighbor polic y of Frank lin Delan
o Roos evelt
also encouraged, direc tly or indir ectly , polic y 1n1tiatives favor
ing
the geo~ hica l diver sifica tion of foreit:?rl trade , great er natio
nal contr ol
over natur al resou rces, and the resch eduli ng of exter nal debt
oblig ation s.
poor profi ts outlo ok at the Cente r encouraged some direc t foreiP
;n in
vestment into La.tin America, and helpe d to conce ntrate the anir.1a
1 spiri ts
of local entre prene urs withi n the done stic mark et. In short ,
the disA

astro us news fran the rest of the world reach ing Iatin America
duriw
the 1930s ma.de policy-makers and Wont l?d opini on feel not only
that
local condi tions were not so bad, after all, but also that no
one knew,
p

1n Cente r or Perip her'J, exact ly what were the roots of
the crisi s nor

.'
how 1t could be overcane.

After a terrible .f'right, this stimulated

an almost exhilarated creativity.
shattered.

'1he old authorities and rules were

It was a t1me calling for reliance on one's discretion.

'

(
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This essay both expands and abstrac ts two earlier ones on the
same topic (Diaz Alejandro 1980 and 1981) • All tables and other referenc es
have been omitted ; interest ed or skeptic al readers are referred to the
earlier papers for fuller, albeit still 1nccnpl ete, doctm1entation of
asserta tions made here • A workshop organize d by Rosemary 'Ihorp at
St • .Antony's College in Oxford during September 1981 was very helpful
for the prepara tion of this essay.
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number of points. Virgini a casey edited and typed these pasi;es in the
cold from a sticky manuscr ipt canplete d in the tropics . Sabbati cal
and leave fran Yale Univers ity and the joyful and stimula ting hos

pitality of the Pontific al Catholic Univers ity of Rio de Janeiro are
~so gratefu lly acknowledp;ed.
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caveats should apply.

'Jhe usual

l

REF'ERENCES

Diaz-Alejandro, carlos F. 1980 !'A America Latina em Depressao:
1929/1930:' Pesquisa e PlaneJanento Econctnico 10:
351-382.

------1981.

"Stories

or the

1930s for the 1980s."

Yale Econanic Growth Center T)1scuss1on Paper

No. 376, April.

